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Abstract
Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical paradoxes), dating
from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries of his solution. The third
states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false.
This appears to contradict the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, which requires that
in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Looking back at Aris-
totle’s treatise De Interpretatione, we find that Aristotle himself, immediately
after defining the notion of a contradictory pair, gave counterexamples to the
rule. Thus Swyneshed’s solution to the logical paradoxes is not contrary to Aris-
totle’s teaching, as many of Swyneshed’s contemporaries claimed. Dialetheism,
the contemporary claim that some propositions are both true and false, is wed-
ded to the Rule, and in consequence divorces denial from the assertion of the
contradictory negation.
Keywords: contradiction, signification, liar paradox, insolubles, truth; Aristotle,
Swyneshed, Heytesbury, Eland, Strode, Paul of Venice.
1 The Rule of Contradictory Pairs
In his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, the Oxford Calculator Roger
Swyneshed made three notorious iconoclastic claims:
1. There is a false proposition which principally signifies as things are
2. There is a formally valid inference with true premise and false conclusion
3. There is a pair of contradictory propositions both of which are false.
In this paper, I am concerned for the most part with the third thesis.1 It is very
natural to dismiss it out of hand, as I did myself in my ‘Introduction’ to my edition
1I will also discuss the first. The second clearly demands attention too: it would seem to entail that
Swyneshed’s account of consequence is not the impossibility of true premises and false conclusion, in
which case, what is his account? It is preservation of principally signfying as it is: see Spade (1979,
§35) and Spade’s comment in Heytesbury (1979, p. 76 n.31).
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of Bradwardine’s treatise on insolubles (Bradwardine, 2010, p. 24). I wrote: “No true
logician would accept (3.) . . . contradictories cannot both be false, by definition.”
But this judgment is too hasty. We owe the introduction of the notion of contra-
dictory pairs of propositions to Aristotle, or as he called them, antiphases. I quote at
some length from De Interpretatione, ch.6:2
“We mean by affirmation a statement affirming one thing of another; we
mean by negation a statement denying one thing of another.
As men can affirm and deny the presence of that which is present and the
presence of that which is absent and this they can do with reference to times
that lie outside the present: whatever a man may affirm, it is possible as well
to deny, and whatever a man may deny, it is possible as well to affirm. Thus,
it follows, each affirmative statement will have its own opposite negative,
just as each negative statement will have its affirmative opposite. Every
such pair of propositions we, therefore, shall call contradictories, always
assuming the predicates and subjects are really the same and the terms
used without ambiguity. These and some other provisos are needed in view
of the puzzles propounded by importunate sophists.” (Aristotle, 1938, pp.
123-5, 17a27-34)
Contradictories are often nowadays defined as two propositions, or statements, that
cannot both be true and cannot both be false. But that is not how Aristotle defines
them. Rather, for him, in a pair of contradictories, one affirms of something what
the other denies of it. As we will see, these definitions are not necessarily equivalent.
One might call Aristotle’s definition in terms of affirmation and denial the syntactic
definition, and the modern one in terms of truth and falsehood, the semantic definition.
Note that Aristotle’s definition guarantees that every statement has a contradictory
and says what it is, whereas the semantic definition does not.3
In his study of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, C.W.A. Whitaker argued that im-
mediately after introducing the notion of contradictories in ch.6, Aristotle set out, in
effect, to show the inequivalence of the two definitions. He did this by providing coun-
terexamples to what Whitaker dubs “the Rule of Contradictory Pairs” (RCP); that in
2This work of Aristotle’s is variously known under the Greek title, Peri Hermeneias, the Latin, De
Interpretatione, and the English, On Interpretation. I resist the last in being particularly unhelpful
and misleading. De Rijk (2002, p. 191) takes from Gabriel Nuchelmans the neologism ‘apophantics’
to describe its content. A clearer term might be to call it ‘On Utterances’ or ‘On the Expression of
Thoughts’.
3Horn (2014, §1) claims that Aristotle “shift[ed] from a formal to a semantically based criterion of
opposition” when setting out contradictories in the square of opposition. Not so: just as ‘pale is not
said of Socrates’ denies of Socrates what ‘pale is said of Socrates’ affirms of him, so too ‘pale is not
said of every man’ denies of man (the universal) what ‘pale is not said of every man’, or equivalently
‘pale is not said of some man’, affirms of man, and ‘pale is said of no man’ denies of man what ‘pale
is said of some man’ affirms of man: “Those contradictory opposites hav[e] universals for subjects.”
(17b27)
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each contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false. In ch.7, Whitaker says,
Aristotle gives examples of contradictory pairs each member of which is true; in ch.8,
pairs each of which is false; and in the famous ch.9, concerning the future sea-battle,
pairs each of which is true or false, but not determinately either.
Russell Jones (2010) echoes Whitaker’s analysis, agreeing that Aristotle’s target is
(RCP), but disagreeing on the detail. In particular, he rejects Whitaker’s claim that
in ch.7, Aristotle shows that both members of a pair can be true, and the claim that
in ch.9, Aristotle accepts that each member of the pair is true or false. To be clear, let
us spell out five theses which are in play:
RCP (Rule of Contradictory Pairs) In a contradictory pair, one member is true and
the other false
BV (Bivalence) Every proposition is either true or false
EM (Excluded Middle) Everything either holds or does not hold of any one thing at
any one time
CV (Contravalence) No proposition is both true and false
NC (Non-Contradiction) Nothing both holds and does not hold of any one thing at
any one time
Given that every proposition is one of a pair of contradictories, (RCP) entails (BV).
Note that both (RCP) and (BV) have the cancellable (Gricean) implicature ‘and not
both’. (BV) and (EM) on the one hand, and (CV) and (NC) on the other are equivalent
by Aristotle’s account of truth and falsehood in the Metaphysics:
“To say that that which is is not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and
to say that that which is is and that which is not is not, is true.” (Aristotle,
1971, p. 23, 1011b26-28)
Whereas (RCP) is about pairs of propositions, (BV) and (CV) are about individual
propositions, and (NC) and (EM) are about things.
Jones’ objection to Whitaker’s analysis of ch.7 turns on whether Aristotle really
does deny (CV). He certainly asserts (NC) in the Metaphysics:
“For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of
the same thing and in the same respect is impossible,” (Aristotle, 1971, p.
7, 1005b19-20)
which is equivalent to (CV) by the account of truth and falsehood just quoted. The
focus of De Interpretatione ch.7 is on indeterminate propositions such as ‘Man is pale’.
Whitaker takes them to be non-universal statements about universals. As such, ‘Man
is pale’ is true because some men are pale. But ‘Man is not pale’ is also true, because
some men are not pale. So the contradictory pair, ‘Man is pale’ and ‘Man is not pale’,
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one affirming of the universal man what the other denies, are both true. So there are
true contradictions, pairs of contradictories both of which are true.
Whitaker (1996, ch.12) claims that this is not in fact a violation of the principle of
Non-Contradiction, (NC). All that ‘Man is pale’ says is that some man is pale, so to
affirm and deny paleness of man is not to claim that the same thing both holds and
does not hold of the same thing in the same respect at the same time, only that “part of
the universal might be pale and part not pale.” (Whitaker, 1996, p. 157) Jones (2010,
p. 41) rightly dismisses this as a fudge. On that reading, ‘Man is pale’ and ‘Man is
not pale’ are no longer contradictories, pairs of propositions in which the same thing is
affirmed and denied of the same thing. Since Aristotle seems to endorse (NC) without
limitation not only in Metaphysics Γ 3 but also in De Interpretatione 12 (21b18-19),
Jones proposes what he claims is a better understanding of Aristotle’s counterexample
to (RCP) in ch.7. There is no such single thing as an indeterminate proposition, he
says. Rather, so-called “indeterminate propositions” are indeterminately universal and
particular. ‘Man is pale’ can be understood either as the universal claim that all men
are pale, or as the particular (better, partial) claim that some men are pale. This is true
even if we express indeterminate propositions more explicitly in English as indefinite
propositions: ‘A man is a rational animal’ is naturally taken as universal; ‘A man is
coming to fix the boiler’ more naturally as particular.
Whitaker’s (and Jones’) interpretation of Aristotle’s project in chs.7-9 is not un-
contested. De Rijk (2002, pp. 252-3), for example, claims that Whitaker’s mistake is to
conflate contradictory pairs of assertibles, such as man’s being pale, man’s not being
pale, with assertions, such as ‘man is pale’, ‘man is not pale’. The former pair can
appear both to be true, but are in fact neither, since, not being assertions, they are
not apt to be true or false. De Rijk (2002, p. 265) thus categorically rejects the idea
that Aristotle’s aim in chs.7-9 is to argue against (RCP).
Moreover, if indeterminate propositions are ambiguous in the way Jones claims,
it is hard to see how Aristotle can claim that “the denial corresponding to a single
affirmative itself must be single as well.” (De Interpretatione 7, 17b37-38) Aristotle
continues: “The denial, that is, must deny just the thing the affirmative affirms of
the selfsame, identical subject.” Both interpretations, Whitaker’s and Jones’, strain
credulity. After all, Jones’ interpretation only yields a pair of contradictories both
of which are true if one member is taken universally and the other partially. Yet
Whitaker’s seems to avoid clashing with (NC) only by denying that the two propositions
affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing, namely, of the universal.
Nonetheless, Aristotle concludes the chapter by saying:
“To sum up the foregoing statements, we showed that a single negation is
opposed to a single affirmation in the manner we called contradictory . . .
We proved of two opposites that it is not the case always that one must be
true and one false.” (Aristotle, 1938, 7, 18a8-12)
So it is at least clear that Aristotle’s aim in ch.7 is to question the universal correctness
of (RCP), even if the examples he gives are unclear. In ch.8, Aristotle presents a further
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counterexample to (RCP), this time one where the two contradictories are both false.
It is a case of the fallacy of many questions, which he also discusses in De Sophisticis
Elenchis 30. Suppose, he says, that ‘cloak’ applies to both man and horse, in the sense
that ‘Cloak is pale’ means ‘Man is pale and horse is pale’. Then its denial, ‘Cloak is
not pale’, is equivalent to ‘Man is not pale and horse is not pale’. If one is pale and
other is not pale, then both are false. A less unnatural example might be to ask if
humans give birth. Some do (women) and some don’t (men). So one cannot agree
that humans give birth, nor deny it. Both are false. There is, as Aristotle says, “not a
single affirmation” since “one name is given to two things which do not make up one
thing” (18a18). All he means by this, it seems, is that they do not make up one thing
as regards the particular question at hand. As he remarks in De Sophisticis Elenchis
30, “a question must be single to which there is a single answer” (181a31). But if one
is asked ‘Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?’ (176a7), no single answer
is possible, if one is and the other is not; and even if they both are (or are not), giving
a single answer can be unclear. Again, by a contradictory pair, Aristotle is referring
in De Interpretatione 8 to a single syntactic denial, and is showing that (RCP) is not
universally true.
Jones also questions Whitaker’s interpretation of Aristotle’s reasoning in ch.9,
though he again agrees with Whitaker that Aristotle’s aim is to give further exam-
ples where (RCP) fails. This is obscured, they both say, by treating ch.9 in isolation,
as so often happens. But seen in the context of chs.6-8 (and the chapters that follow)
it becomes clear the (RCP) is the focus, even though (BV) is involved. Ch.8, offering
further counterexamples to (RCP), closes with the words:
“And accordingly not even here is one necessarily true and one false of two
statements opposed contradictorily,” (Aristotle, 1938, 18a27)
and ch.9 continues:
“In regard to things present or past . . . of those contradictorily opposed
one, again, must be true and one false, when they have a universal for
subject and are in themselves universal . . . This need not, however, be so
in the case of two such propositions as have universals for subjects but are
not themselves universals.” (Aristotle, 1938, 18a28-32)
(That was the upshot of ch.7.) Now comes the topic of ch.9:
“When, however, we come to propositions whose subjects are singular
terms, while their predicates refer to the future and not to the present
or past, then we find that the case is quite changed.” (Aristotle, 1938,
18a33-5)
Recall that (RCP) is about contradictory pairs of propositions, whereas (BV) is
about single propositions. The argument of ch.9 is a reductio ad absurdum. Whitaker
and Jones claim that the premise of the reductio, the claim to be rejected, is (RCP),
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not (BV), that is, a claim about a contradictory pair, that one is true, the other false,
not the claim that a single proposition is true or false. Aristotle writes:
“These and other strange consequences follow provided we assume in the
case of a pair of contradictory opposites . . . that one must be true, the
other false,” (Aristotle, 1938, 18b26)
and he concludes:
“There is evidently, then, no necessity that one should be true, the other
false, in the case of affirmations and denials. For the case of those things
which as yet are potential, not actually existent, is different from that of
things actual.” (Aristotle, 1938, 19a39-b3)
Aristotle clearly concludes that (RCP) fails for future contingents. Whitaker and
Jones disagree, however, about his commitment to (BV) about future contingents.
That is a claim about a single proposition, e.g., ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’.
If he denies (BV), as Jones claims, we have a simple explanation of the failure of (RCP),
since as we noted, (RCP) entails (BV). However, Whitaker (1996, p. 125) claims that
Aristotle is elsewhere committed to (BV), and never questions it in ch.9. He is left with
the difficult task of explaining how each member of the contradictory pair is true or
false, by (BV), but in such a way that (RCP) fails. His answer is that they are true or
false, but not determinately either, so that the question of which cannot be answered
in a dialectical dispute. No determinate answer can be given in advance.
Coming back to Swyneshed: at the end of his treatise on insolubles, he writes:
“If in these remarks what is perfect or consonant with truth was found, it
was gathered from the sayings of Aristotle and of other revered masters. If
what was imperfect or dissonant with the truth is found, its insufficiency
should be impugned only to me. So be it.”4
Not all his contemporaries were convinced, however. Twenty years later, Ralph Strode
wrote, concerning Roger’s first thesis in particular:
“It seems to be quite expressly contrary to age-old principles passed down
by the most highly regarded philosophers and familiar to the whole commu-
nity of moderns without any question or doubt and especially contrary to
Aristotle’s principles in the first book of De Interpretatione, the first book
of the Prior Analytics, the first book of the Topics and the fourth book of
the Metaphysics.”5
4Spade (1979, p. 220), reprinted in Spade (1988): In istis autem si quid completum sive veritati
consonum repertum fuerit, ex dictis Aristotelis et aliorum reverendorum magistrorum colligitur. Si
quid diminutum aut veritati dissonum inveniatur, soli meae insufficientiae est impugnandum. Amen.
Translations from Spade (1979) are my own.
5Spade (1978, p. 76): . . . videtur satis expresse esse contra antiqua principia a philosophis maxime
approbatis tradita et a tota communitate modernorum sine aliqua inquisitione seu dubitatione vsitata,
et precipue contra principia Aristotelis primo Peryerminias et primo Priorum et primo Topicorum et
quarto Methaphisice. Translations from Spade (1978) are my own.
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But at least as regards exceptions to (RCP), Roger seems to be in agreement with
Aristotle. Pairs of contradictories do not necessarily have opposite truth-values.
2 Swyneshed’s Third Thesis
Let us now return to Roger’s third thesis, and consider his argument for it. The thesis
claims that there is a pair of contradictories both of which are false. His example is
the simple Liar paradox: ‘This is false’, referring to itself. The usual argument to a
paradox runs as follows. If it were true, assuming it signifies only that it is false, and
that a proposition is true just when it signifies as it is, it would be false and so not
true. So it is false. But if it is false, it signifies other than it is, by the usual account
of falsehood, so it is not false but true. We have shown that it is true if and only if it
is false, and so by reductio ad absurdum, it is both true and false.
Roger’s solution to the paradox is to strengthen the condition for truth and cor-
respondingly weaken that for falsehood. Some propositions, he notes, are relevant to
inferring their own falsehood, and so they could be said to falsify themselves even if
they otherwise signify as it is. So a proposition is false, he said, not only if it is not as
it signifies, but also if it falsifies itself. Correspondingly, it is true only if it not only
signifies as it is, but does not falsify itself. The simple Liar is, accordingly, simply false,
since it falsifies itself. The first thesis records this: here is a false proposition, ‘This is
false’, which signifies as it is. How does it falsify itself? By the simple fact that from
what it signifies, namely that it is false, it directly follows that it is false. In general:
“Some propositions falsify themselves indirectly, some directly. A propo-
sition falsifying itself indirectly is a proposition signifying principally as it
is or other than it is and that, so signifying, falsifies another proposition
falsifying it . . . A proposition falsifying itself directly is a proposition sig-
nifying principally as it is or other than it is, relevant to inferring itself
to be false. And it is of two kinds. Some are relevant sufficiently, some
are relevant insufficiently. Relevant sufficiently are propositions signifying
principally as it is or other than it is from which, signifying in this way, it
directly follows or is apt to follow that they are false. An example: let the
proposition ‘This is false’ signify principally that this is false, referring to
itself. Then it directly follows ‘This is false, therefore, this is false’. And in
this way it is relevant sufficiently to inferring itself to be false.”6
6Spade (1979, pp. 182-3): Quaedam falsificat se mediate, quaedam immediate. Propositio falsificans
se mediate est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est et ipsa sic significando
falsificat propositionem aliam a se falsificantem se . . . Propositio falsificans se immediate est propositio
significans princi-paliter sicut est velss aliter quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam.
Et illa est duplex. Quaedam est pertinens sufficiens, quaedam est pertinens insufficiens. Pertinens
sufficiens est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est ex qua sic significando
immediate sequitur vel est natum sequi ipsam fore falsam. Exemplum: Significet ilia propositio ‘Hoc
est falsum’ principaliter quod hoc est falsum, ipsamet demonstrata. Tunc sequitur immediate ‘Hoc est
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From here, the proof of Roger’s third thesis is fairly immediate. ‘This is false’
signifies of itself that it is false. To contradict this, we take the proposition which
denies of that first proposition that it is false, namely, ‘That is not false’, referring by
‘that’ to ‘This is false’. Then clearly ‘This is false’ is false because it falsifies itself, and
‘That is not false’ is false because it signifies other than it is, namely, that the false
proposition ‘This is false’ is not false. Two contradictories are at the same time false.
All Ralph Strode can find to say in response to this is to repeat his claim that this
is contrary to Aristotle’s teaching:
“The opposite of [the conclusion that two contradictories mutually contra-
dicting each other are at the same time false] is clear by Aristotle in the
Postpredicaments, in the fourth book of the Metaphysics and in the first
book of the Perihermeneias, where he quite expressly insists that it is im-
possible that two contradictories mutually contradicting one another are at
the same time true or at the same time false.”7
In a similar way, Robert Eland (Spade, 1978, p. 65) simply describes Roger’s conclusion
as “impossible” and splutters that “these conclusions are contrary to the opinion of
many of the wise”.8 But William Heytesbury (1979, pp. 26-27) does try to provide an
argument against Roger’s position.9 To do so, he takes the proposition ‘This propo-
sition signifies other than it is’, call it A, assuming it to signify only that A signifies
other than it is. Next, take another proposition, B, which signifies just as A does,
namely, that A signifies other than it is. Now either A signifies wholly as it is, or not.
William’s idea is to derive a contradiction from each leg of this disjunction using only
principles that Roger endorses. So first, suppose that it is not wholly as A signifies,
that is, A signifies other than it is. Since B signifies that A signifies other than it is,
and only that, it is as B signifies. Moreover, A signifies exactly as B does, so it is as
A signifies, that is, A does not signify other than it is. Contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose it is wholly as A signifies. Let C be the contradictory
of B, that is, let C deny of A whatever B affirms of A. So C signifies that A does not
signify other than it is, that is, that A signifies as it is. Then C is true, for we have
assumed that it is as A signifies, and C does not falsify itself. Moreover, B and C are
contradictories, so B is false. (Here, William appears to assume that Roger does not
think that a pair of contradictories can both be true, even if he believes that they can
both be false.) Moreover, B does not falsify itself either, so B must signify other than
it is. Since A signifies exactly as B does, and B signifies that A signifies other than it
falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’. Et sic illa est pertinens sufficiens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam.
7Spade (1978, pp. 76-7): Oppositum . . . patet per Aristotelem in Postpredicamentis et quarto
Metaphisice et primo Peryermenias, ubi satis expresse vult quod impossibile est duo contradictoria
sibi invicem contradicentia esse simul vera vel simul falsa.
8(Spade, 1978, p. 68): Istae conclusiones sunt contra opinionem plurium sapientium. On the
identity of Robert Eland, called ‘Fland’ by Spade, see Read and Thakkar (2016).
9For the Latin text, see Pozzi (1987, p. 218).
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is, it follows that A must signify other than it is. Once again, we have a contradiction.
So either way, Roger’s theory leads to contradiction.
In his treatise on ‘Insolubles’, the final treatise of his Logica Magna, Paul of Venice
presents and defends a theory of insolubles in many ways similar to Roger’s. He then
considers a succession of arguments against the theory, rehearsing each of William’s
objections in turn, including that deriving a contradiction from supposing that ‘This
proposition signifies other than it is’ either signifies other than it is or not. He offers
two responses to the objection. His first is this:
“To the second argument, I say, accepting the scenario, that it is not wholly
as A signifies, and so consequently, I concede that A signifies other than it
is. And then to the argument: ‘A signifies other than it is, and B signifies
only that A signifies other than it is, so it is wholly as B signifies’: I grant
the inference and the conclusion; and then to the argument: ‘It is wholly
as B signifies and proposition A wholly signifies like B and vice versa,
therefore it is wholly as A signifies’: I deny the inference, but it should be
added in the premise that it is not inconsistent that A is true, and this I
deny. For A falsifies itself, in that it asserts itself to signify other than it
is, and this is why it is inconsistent for A to be true.”10
Thus Paul believes that the proposition in question, A, is an insoluble, and so falsi-
fies itself in signifying other than it is. We have a Moorean paradox: if I say ‘This
very proposition is false’, or ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, I may also
immediately say correctly, ‘and what I just said was false’.
Paul subsequently proposes a different solution to the first three objections (of
William’s) that he considers:
“But one can respond to all these arguments in another way, admitting the
scenario, by always denying each contradictory, namely, ‘It is as Socrates
says it is’, ‘It is not as Socrates says it is’; ‘It is as A signifies’, ‘It is not as A
signifies’; ‘Some proposition signifies other than it is’, ‘No proposition signi-
fies other than it is’. For just as it is not impossible for two contradictories
to be false at the same time in the case of insolubles, so it is not impossible
for the same thing to be denied at the same time in that sort of case, and
10Paulus Venetus (1499, f. 196rb) corrected against manuscript Vat.lat.2132, f. 241ra: Ad secundam
rationem dico admisso casu quod non est ita totaliter sicut a significat, et ita consequenter concedo
quod a significat aliter quam est. Et tunc ad argumentum: a propositio significat aliter quam est et b
significat solummodo quod a significat aliter quam est, igitur ita est totaliter sicut b significat: concedo
consequentiam et consequens; et tunc ad argumentum: ita est totaliter sicut b significat et a propositio
totaliter significat sicut b et econtra, igitur ita est totaliter sicut a significat: nego consequentiam, sed
deberet addi in antecedente quod non repugnat a esse verum et hoc negatur. Unde a falsificat se ex
quo asserit se significare aliter quam est, quare repugnat a esse verum. (Text and translation from
Paul’s treatise on ‘Insolubles’ are from an edition currently in preparation by Barbara Bartocci and
myself.)
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especially when insolubles principally reflect on their own signification, as
experience has taught in the foregoing arguments.”11
This is to deny both that A signifies as it is and that A signifies other than it is. It is
a denial of (EM), and consequently of (BV).
This is in fact how Roger himself would deal with the paradox, as we will see. One
might wonder, however, whether it is a coherent response from Paul. Does he really
accept this alternative response, or is he simply including it in deference to Roger? The
problem arises because Paul’s account of truth, though obviously inspired by Roger’s,
is somewhat different. Paul writes:
“A true proposition is one whose exact significate is true and for which it
is not inconsistent that the proposition is true. This is clear from what has
been said in the treatise ‘On the truth and falsity of propositions’. . . [and]
a false proposition is one which falsifies itself or whose falsity does not arise
from its terms, but from its false exact significate.”12
Talk of the “exact significate” (significatum adequatum) is found in many fourteenth-
century authors, notably Gregory of Rimini, from whom Paul took it.13 Gregory uses
the term to denote the object of demonstrative knowledge, the famous complexe sig-
nificabile, what is signified complexly, namely, by propositions. Paul adapts Gregory’s
theory in a radical way, claiming that the “exact significate” of a subject-predicate
proposition is in reality the exact significate of its subject or predicate:
“For any true affirmative present-tense proposition that has no ampliative
verb or a term that is somehow distracting, the exact significate of the
subject or the exact significate of the predicate is really identical with its
principal significate.”14
Thus, whereas for Gregory and others what is complexly significable has itself some
real propositional complexity, for Paul it does not—rather, he claims that the exact
11Paulus Venetus (1499, f. 196rb, Vat.lat.2132, f. 241ra): Potest tamen ad hec omnia aliter responderi
negando semper admisso casu utrumque contradictorium, videlicet: ita est sicut sortes dicit, non est
ita sicut sortes dicit; ita est sicut a significat, non est ita sicut a significat; aliqua propositio significat
aliter quam est, nulla propositio significat aliter quam est. Sicut enim non est inconveniens duo
contraditoria esse simul falsa in materia insolubilium ita non est inconveniens eadem simul negari
in eadem materia, et precipue quando insolubilia habent principaliter reflexionem ad significationem
propriam, ut in predictis motivis experientia docuit.
12Paulus Venetus (1499, f. 194vb, Vat.lat.2132, f. 239rb): Propositio vera est illa cuius adequatum
significatum est verum et non repugnat ipsam esse veram. Patet ex dictis in de veritate et falsitate
propositionum . . . propositio falsa dicitur esse illa que falsificat se, aut cuius falsitas non consurgit ex
terminis sed ex adequato significato falso. See also Paulus Venetus (1978, pp. 62).
13See Conti (2004, p. 474).
14Paulus Venetus (1978, p. 166): Quarta conclusio . . . cuiuslibet propositionis verae et affirmativae
de praesenti sine verbo ampliativo aut termino distrahente aliqualiter, adaequatum significatum subiecti
aut praedicati principali significato est communicabile identice realiter. Translations from Paulus
Venetus (1978) are my own.
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significate of the proposition is really, though not formally, identical to that of the
subject or predicate:
“What is exactly and complexly signifiable by any proposition and has
a place in reality, is somehow distinct from what is stateable and non-
complexly signifiable by its subject or predicate. . . . God is formally dis-
tinct from God existing. . . . These notions are distinct, but not really dis-
tinct, therefore, formally distinct . . . There is a formal distinction between
those signifiable by a complex and those signifiable by a non-complex.”15
3 Truth and Signification
Nonetheless, Paul’s account of truth and falsity is puzzling: a proposition’s truth was
linked in the above passage to the truth of its exact significate, and the same for
falsehood. But when is the exact significate true, and what does its truth consist in?
Conti (2004, p. 483) claims that Paul inverts the order of explanation, defining
the truth of the exact significate as dependent on the truth of the proposition. This
is shown, Conti claims, by his placing the treatise on truth and falsity in the Logica
Magna before that on the significate of the proposition. The passage connecting the
truth of the proposition with that of its exact significate occurs at the end of that earlier
treatise leading into the subsequent discussion of its exact significate. Paul writes:
“If the exact significate of a proposition is true and it is not inconsistent that
the proposition, thus exactly signifying, should be true, then the proposition
is true.”16
The preceding discussion in this treatise, however, consists entirely of refutation of
other accounts of truth. If Conti is right, then there is no account of truth in the
the Logica Magna. There is no preceding account of the truth of propositions that
is endorsed and accepted by Paul; and though he states, in his second thesis, that
if a proposition is true, so too is its exact significate, he also believes that its exact
significate can be true even if the proposition itself is false because its falsifies itself.
In that case, however, the truth of the significate cannot be grounded on that of the
proposition. Take ‘This proposition is both true and false’, for example. Its exact
significate is false, whereas the exact significate of ‘This proposition is false’ is true,
and they both falsify themselves. So the truth of the exact significate of a proposition
cannot be defined in terms of the truth or falsity of the proposition itself. The order of
15Paulus Venetus (1978, pp. 156-8): Cuiuslibet propositionis adaequate complexe significabile quod
in natura ponitur a suo incomplexe significabili per subiectum vel praedicatum enuntiabile aliqualiter
distinguitur. . . . formaliter distinguitur . . . Deus a Deum esse. . . . est distinctio formalis . . . inter
complexe et incomplexe significabilia.
16Paulus Venetus (1978, p. 62): Prima 〈conclusio〉 est si alicuius propositionis significatum adae-
quatum est verum, et non repugnat illam propositionem esse veram, sic significando adaequate, illa
propositio est vera.
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the treatises can also be explained without Conti’s proposed inversion: having found
all other accounts of truth wanting, Paul proposes his own, which defines the truth of
the proposition in terms of the truth of its significate (taking the first thesis at face
value); that then serves to motivate the following treatise, on the significate of the
proposition.
Such an account as Paul’s is definitely realist, postulating a real correlate to every
significant proposition. The consequence is that Paul appears to be committed to (BV)
and (EM) where Roger is not.17 Talk of the significate of the proposition does not occur
in Roger, where instead he talks of “signifying principally”. Maieru` (1972, pp. 489-90)
cites Strode’s Consequentiae as saying:
“A grammatical indicative utterance exactly significative of truth or falsity
is called a proposition. And what results exactly from all the significations
of its immediate verbal parts is said to be the exact or principal or total
signification of the proposition.”18
By the principal signification (Roger) and the exact signification (Paul) each means
what the whole proposition signifies but ignoring any secondary or consequential sig-
nification.19 In contrast to Paul’s, Roger’s account of truth and falsehood, though
described in terms of how a proposition principally signifies, does not appeal to any
corresponding true or false entity or significate:
“There follow four definitions or descriptions. The first is this: a proposition
is a congruent indicative utterance significative either naturally or by an
imposition by which it was last imposed to signify complexly.
The second is this: a true proposition is a proposition not falsifying itself
signifying principally as it is either naturally or by an imposition by which
it was last imposed to signify.
Third definition: a false proposition is an utterance falsifying itself or an
utterance not falsifying itself signifying principally other than it is either
naturally or by an imposition by which it was last imposed to signify.
The fourth is this: an insoluble as put forward is a proposition signifying
principally as it is or other than it is which is relevant to inferring itself to
be false or unknown or not believed, and so on.”20
17But see Hanke (2017), who elaborates a non-bivalent semantics for Paul’s and Roger’s theories.
18Et oratio indicativa congrua veri vel falsi adaequate significativa dicitur propositio. Et dicitur
adaequata vel principalis vel totalis significatio propositionis quae resultat adaequate ex omnibus signi-
ficationibus suarum partium propinquarum quae sunt dicitones. (My own translation.) Note, however,
that although Paul’s exact and Roger’s principal signification may be the same, Paul believes that
the total signification is greater than its exact signification. See Paulus Venetus (1978, ‘On the Signi-
ficatum of a Proposition’, thesis 3: p. 192).
19See, e.g., Spade (1983, p. 106).
20Spade (1979, pp. 185-6): Post illa sequuntur quattuor diffinitiones seu descriptiones. Prima est
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One might think that this rules out a proposition’s being neither true nor false.
However, Roger points out right at the start of his treatise that there is a third option:
“A proposition neither signifying principally as it is nor other than it is, that
is, which is neither true nor false, is a proposition signifying in some way
and that so signifying is relevant to inferring itself not to signify principally
as it is, for example, the proposition ‘This proposition does not signify as
it is’, referring to itself, which principally signifies that it itself does not
signify as it is. And this similarly, ‘Every proposition signifies other than
it is’, which principally signifies that every proposition signifies other than
it is.”21
The equation of ‘neither signifying as it is nor other than it is’ with ‘that is, is neither
true nor false’ occurs in only one manuscript.22 But it is borne out by later remarks,
in particular, an objection which Roger considers. It runs:
“One argues against these proposals in many ways. First, like this: one of
those proposals claims that some proposition is neither true nor false, which
is contrary to Aristotle in the Categories where he says in one place: “Now
it seems that every affirmation is true or false”,23 from which it follows that
every affirmative is true or false. And if this is true of these affirmatives,
for the same reason it will be true of negatives.”24
Roger responds:
haec: propositio est oratio indicativa congrua naturaliter, ex impositione, vel impositionibus qua vel
quibus ultimo fuit imposita complexe ad significandum significativa. Secunda est haec: propositio
vera est propositio non falsificans se principaliter sicut est significans naturaliter aut ex impositione
vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposita ad significandum. Tertia definitio: propositio
falsa est oratio falsificans se vel oratio non falsificans se principaliter aliterl quam est significans
naturaliter, ex irnpositione, vel impositionibus qua vel quibus ultimo fuit imposita ad significandum.
Quarta est haec: insolubile ad propositum est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter
quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam vel nescitam vel 〈non〉creditam, et sic de
singulis. (‘non’ is added in that final clause at the suggestion of Pozzi (1987, p. 182).)
21Spade (1979, pp. 180-1): Propositio nec principaliter significans sicut est nec aliter quam est, id
est, quae nec est vera nec falsa, est propositio significans aliqualiter esse et ilia sic significando est
pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam non significare principaliter sicut est, sicut haec propositio ‘Haec
propositio non significatso sicut est’, demonstrata ilia eadem, quae principaliter significet quod ipsa
non significat sicut est. Et haec similiter ‘Omnis propositio significat aliter quam est’ quae principaliter
significet quod omnis propositio significat aliter quam est.
22See Spade (1979, p. 180 n.27).
23Spade refers to Categories 4, 2a6-7.
24Spade (1979, p. 190): Contra illas propositiones arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic: una illarum
propositionum ponit aliquam propositionem fore nec veram nec falsam, quod est contra Aristotelem
in Praedicamenlis ubi dicit in uno loco sic: “Videtur autem omnis affirmatio vera vel falsa”. Ex qua
sequitur quod omnis affirmativa est vera vel falsa. Et si hoc est verum de istis affirmativis, eadem
ratione erit verum de negativis.
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“Where Aristotle claims authoritatively,“Now it seems” etc., he means to
draw a distinction between propositions and the incomplex terms from
which propositions are composed. Therefore, his point is that every truth
or falsehood is an affirmative or negative proposition. And it follows that
no incomplex term is true or false. Thus the first appeal to authority is
accommodated. . . .
It should be understood that every proposition signifying principally as it
is or other than it is, whether it is of the present or the past or the future
tense, whether of necessity or of contingency, whose truth depends on the
present, is either true or false and no others. From this it is clear that
there are many propositions which are neither true nor false, such as ‘This
signifies other than it is’, referring to itself and principally signifying in that
way, ‘You will be dead tomorrow’, and universally all propositions of future
contingency whose truth does not depend on the present,”25
alluding specifically to Aristotle’s apparent rejection of (BV) in De Interpretatione ch.9.
In fact, although ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’ is the first problematic
example which Roger mentions in his ‘Insolubles’ (p. 181), he goes on to claim that it
is in fact not an insoluble, for it does not falsify itself, and is not false:
“It remains to solve some sophisms which appear to be insolubles but are
not, e.g., ‘A is known’, ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, ‘That
proposition does not signify other than it is’, ‘This proposition does not
signify as it is’, and similar ones.”26
Take ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’. This should be denied, Roger says.
It doesn’t signify other than it is, nor as it is. It doesn’t signify as it is, for if it did,
it wouldn’t, and so by the usual reductio argument, it doesn’t. But if it doesn’t, it is
tempting to argue for a contradiction as follows: if it doesn’t signify other than it is,
then it must signify as it is, since it does signify in a complex way. But if so, then
it must signify other than it is, for that is what it signifies. That move is invalid,
Roger says. For recall the discussion of signifying from the start of the treatise: some
25Spade (1979, p. 191): Ubi Aristoteles ponit illam auctoritatem, “Videtur autem,” et cetera, in-
tendit ponere differentiam inter propositiones et incomplexa ex quibus componuntur propositiones.
Differentia igitur sua est quod omne verum vel falsum est propositio affirmativa vel negativa. Et se-
quitur quod nullum incomplexum est verum vel falsum. Et sic salvatur prima auctoritas . . . Pro quo
est sciendum quod omnis propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter quam est sive sit de
praesenti sive de praeterito sive de futuro, sive de necessaria sive de contingenti, cujus veritas de-
pendet a praesenti est vera vel falsa et nulla alia. Ex quo patet quod multae sunt propositiones quae
nec sunt verae nec falsae cujusmodi sunt illae ‘Haec significat aliter quam est’, eadem demonstrata
sic principaliter significante, ‘Tu eris mortuus cras’, et universaliter omnes propositiones de futuro
contingenti quarum veritas non dependet a praesenti.
26Spade (1979, p. 215): . . . superest solvere quaedam sophismata quae apparent insolubilia et non
sunt, sicut sint ‘a est scitum’, ‘Ista propositio significat aliter quam est’, ‘Illa propositio non significat
aliter quam est’, ‘Ista propositio non significat sicut est’, et his similes.
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propositions signify as it is, others other than it is, and yet others neither as it is nor
other than it is. That last group consists of those that signify in some complex way but,
signifying in that way, are relevant to inferring themselves not to signify as it is. That
is the case with ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’, for we can immediately
infer from the proposition’s signifying other than it is that it doesn’t signify as it is. So
it does not follow from the fact that it doesn’t signify other than it is that it signifies
as it is, even though what it signifies is that it signifies other than it is.
Recall Heytesbury’s argument. It was premised on the assumption that either a
proposition signifies as it is or not (given that it signifies in some way). Roger simply
denies that basic assumption of (EM) and the instance of (BV) that goes with it.
However, one might question whether Roger’s rejection of (EM) is really open to Paul,
given his much more strongly realist account of truth.
Roger considers a final objection: his proposed solution means that “there are two
mutually contradictory contradictories one of which signifies as it is while the other
does not signify other than it is.”27 Take B: ‘A does not signify other than it is’, the
contradictory of A: ‘This proposition signifies other than it is’. Then B signifies as
it is, while, as we have seen, A does not signify other than it is (or as it is, for that
matter). For B is not relevant to inferring that it does not itself signify as it is whereas
A is. So indeed, the opponent is right, and we have a further thesis, parallel to Roger’s
third thesis, and again contradicting (RCP).
In fact, B is true, so Roger is indeed committed to the thesis Eland (Spade, 1978,
p. 65) levels at him as an objection, and as elaborated by Strode:
“The sixth conclusion is this, that there are two contradictories of which
one is true and the other neither signifies as it is nor other than it is, and in
consequence, according to [Roger’s] opinion, neither true nor false . . . And
that this thesis is unacceptable is clear enough according to Aristotle in the
Postpredicaments, and the first book of De Interpretatione, where he quite
expressly insists that if one of contradictories is true the other is false, and
vice versa.”28
But as we have seen, this is not contrary to Aristotle’s account of contradictories in
the De Interpretatione, but arguably very much in accord with it.
27Spade (1979, p. 218): aliqua sunt duo contradictoria sibi invicem contradicentia et unum illorum
significat sicut est et aliud non significat aliter quam est.
28Spade (1978, p. 78-9), corrected against manuscript Erfurt Q255: Sexta conclusio est ista, quod
aliqua sunt duo contradictoria, quorum unum est verum et reliquum nec significans sicud est nec aliter
quam est, et per consequens secundum istam opinionem nec 〈est〉 verum nec falsum . . . Et quod ista
conclusio sit inconveniens satis patet per Aristotelem in Postpredicamentis et primo Peryerminias, ubi
satis expresse vult 〈quod〉 si unum contradictoriorum sit 〈verum〉, reliquum est falsum, et e converso.
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4 Negation and Denial
What is the contemporary relevance of these reflections? On the semantic account of
contradictories, whereby pairs of contradictories must have opposite truth-value, it is
impossible for there to be true contradictions, pairs of contradictories both of which
are true, or both false. Indeed, by (RCP), or even by a weak form of (RCP) which
says that if one of the pair is true the other false and vice versa, if both are false then
both are true. This weak form of (RCP) is compatible with their lacking truth-value
altogether and with their both being both true and false. But it is not compatible
with Swyneshed’s third thesis, their both being false and not true, nor with Aristotle’s
counterexamples in chs.7-8, at least.
On the syntactic account, however, whereby one member of each contradictory pair
denies what the other affirms, numerous counterexamples to (RCP) are to be found,
notably among the logical paradoxes, according to some medieval responses to the
insolubles. Indeed, there seem to be counterexamples even to (EM) and (BV).
Graham Priest is a Roger Swyneshed for our own times, with his own iconoclastic
thesis:
“Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true: there are sen-
tences (statements, propositions, or whatever one takes truth-bearers to
be), α, such that both α and ¬α are true, that is, such that α is both true
and false.”29
Here ¬α is the negation of α. Priest (2006b, p. 70) rejects the principle that the truth
of ¬α excludes the truth of α.
But care is needed here in identifying ¬α. Priest (2006a, p. 76 n.2) refers us
to Priest (2007, §7.2), where he describes Aristotle’s account of negation as being
encapsulated in the square of opposition. As we have seen, that is only part of the
story, Aristotle’s account as applied specifically to the A, E, I and O forms of subject-
predicate propositions. Even here, there are counterexamples. Suppose, to take a
medieval example, God has annihilated all affirmative propositions apart from ‘Some
affirmative proposition is false’. Then that proposition, being the only affirmative
proposition, falsifies itself, and so on Swyneshed’s account is false (and also in many
other accounts, e.g., Bradwardine’s). But ‘No affirmative proposition is false’ is also
false, for there is a false affirmative proposition, namely, ‘Some affirmative proposition
is false’. So they are both false, yet they are contradictories, in that one denies what
the other affirms.
There are problems of translation here, since ‘negation’ and ‘denial’ are often run
together by the translators, perhaps even by Aristotle himself, but we can take it that
¬α and α are intended by Priest and other modern authors to correspond to Aristotle’s
pairs of contradictories or opposites.30 Priest (2006a, p. 77) writes:
29Priest (2006a, p. 1).
30However, some commentators, e.g., Whitaker (1996, p. 81), claim that for Aristotle, negation
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“We have a grasp of negation . . . and we can use this to determine when
‘notting’ negates . . . [T]here appears to be a relationship of a certain kind
between pairs such as ‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates is not mortal’;
and ‘Some man is mortal’ and ‘No man is mortal’. The traditional way of
expressing the relationship is that the pairs are contradictories, and so we
may say that the relationship is that of contradiction. Theories of negation
are theories about this relation.”
But recall that Aristotle described ¬α (that is, the opposite, or contradictory, of α)
as denying what α affirmed, or asserted. However, Priest (2006a, p. 104) rejects an
identification he attributes to Frege:
“to deny α is simply to assert ¬α.”
Rather, he says, we can deny something in many different ways:
“I can shake my head, say ‘no’ or even stomp off in a rage. Perhaps more
importantly, consider someone who supposes that some sentences are nei-
ther true nor false.” (loc.cit.)
But none of these is incompatible with asserting ¬α, indeed, most of them entail it.
That’s certainly true of the head shake and saying ‘no’. Stomping off suggests either
implicit assertion of ¬α or the (badly named) metalinguistic rejection of α, as in ‘I’m
not the UK expert, I’m the world expert’.31 That is not to deny you’re the UK expert,
it entails that you are. Lastly, if a sentence is neither true nor false, it’s not true.32 So
denying α actually entails asserting ¬α.
However, Priest claims, we can assert ¬α without denying α. He is forced to do
this by his definition of falsehood:
“The definition of falsity assures us that ¬α is true iff α is false.”33
That is the weak (RCP), that if one of a pair of contradictories is true, the other is false,
and vice versa. Indeed, given his endorsement of (BV),34 Priest is in fact committed to
(RCP) in full, albeit without the cancellable implicature of (CV). Thus Priest retains
(RCP) and rejects Frege’s Aristotelian identification of the assertion of ¬α with the
denial of α.
was not an external operation, but rather, internal to the assertion, and so the notation ¬α is not
appropriate in his case.
31See (Priest, 2006a, p. 77) and Horn and Wansing (2017, §1.10).
32Intuitionists reject (BV) in a more subtle way, by refusing to assert that every proposition is either
true or false, but not by claiming that any given sentence is neither true nor false. Since they assert the
double negation of (EM), it would be inconsistent either to deny (BV) or to assert its contradictory.
33Priest (2006a, p. 81).
34Priest (2007, p. 146) observes that in his logic of paradox (LP), “each sentence is either true or
false or both.”
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By rejecting (RCP), Aristotle is able to square rejecting (BV) and (EM) with
identifying negation and denial—and he could even reject (NC) and (CV), though
he chooses not to. Aristotle claims that if β denies (of x) what γ affirms (of x), then β
and γ are contradictories, that is, β = ¬γ. Faced with the counterexamples in chs.7-9
of De Interpretatione, Aristotle rejects (RCP), even in its weakened form.
5 Conclusion
To sum up: Swyneshed enunciated three notorious consequences of his proposed solu-
tion to the insolubles, the most famous of which is his claim that it is possible for both
members of a contradictory pair to be false. This appears to run contrary to a basic
principle, the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, that in each such pair, one member is true
and the other false, a principle often attributed to Aristotle. But two recent authors
who have looked closely at Aristotle’s arguments in the central chapters of his treatise
De Interpretatione claim that Aristotle rejects this principle, presenting a succession
of counterexamples to it, culminating in his discussion of the future sea-battle in ch.9.
Swyneshed himself likens his approach to the insolubles to the problem of future
contingents, citing them as counterexamples not only to the Rule of Contradictory
Pairs, (RCP), but also to the Principle of Bivalence, (BV). Indeed, the paradoxes of
signification, exemplified by the self-referential proposition ‘This proposition signifies
other than it is’, are counterexamples also to the Law of Excluded Middle, (EM).
Whatever may be wrong with Swyneshed’s solution it is not that it is contrary to
Aristotle’s teaching, if Whitaker and Jones are right.
Graham Priest’s dialetheism claims that some contradictions, that is, pairs of con-
tradictories, are true, equivalently, that some propositions are both true and false.
In fact, he endorses (RCP), equating the falsehood of α with the truth of ¬α (its
negation). As a consequence, negation and denial come apart, and ¬α is no longer
the (Aristotelian) contradictory of α. Aristotle and Swyneshed might appear to be in
agreement with dialetheism, allowing contradictories to be true or false together. But
in contrast, they reject (RCP), and at least in the case of the latter, (BV), and so this
is only a superficial agreement.
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